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Summary. We analyze a 19-year time series of North American electric power
transmission system blackouts. Contrary to previously reported results we find a
fatter than exponential decay in the distribution of inter-occurrence times and ev-
idence of seasonal dependence in the number of events. Our findings question the
use of self-organized criticality, and in particular the sandpile model, as a paradigm
of blackout dynamics in power transmission systems. Hopefully, though, they will
provide guidelines to more accurate models for evaluation of blackout risk.
Electric power transmission networks are complex systems.1 Due to eco-
nomic factors, they are commonly run near their operational limits. Major
cascading disturbances or blackouts of these transmission systems have seri-
ous consequences. Although, each blackout can be attributed to a particular
cause: natural peril, equipment malfunction or human behavior, an exclusive
focus on the causes of these events can overlook the global dynamics of a
complex system. Instead, it might be interesting to study blackouts from a
top-down perspective. Following Carreras et al. (2004) we analyze a time series
of blackouts to explore the nature of these complex systems. However, despite
the fact that we are using the same database we obtain different results. Con-
sequently, we challenge their arguments that lead to modeling blackouts as a
self-organized criticality (SOC) phenomenon (Bak et al., 1987).
The reliability events — like the August 1996 blackout in Northwestern
America that disconnected 30,390 MW of power to 7.5 million customers or
the even more spectacular August 2003 blackout in Northeastern America
that disconnected 61,800 MW of power to 50 million people — demonstrate
that the necessary operating practices, regulatory policies, and technological
tools for dealing with the changes are not yet in place to assure an acceptable
level of reliability. In a restructured environment, prices are a matter of private
choice, yet the reliability of the delivery system affects everyone.
1 For a brief review of approaches to complex systems and cascading failure in
power system blackouts see Dobson et al. (2004).
Naturally, the operation of the electric system is more difficult to coordi-
nate in a competitive environment, where a much larger number of parties are
participating. For example, in North America about one-half of all domestic
generation is now sold over ever-increasing distances on the wholesale mar-
ket before it is delivered to customers (Albert et al., 2004). Consequently the
power grid is witnessing power flows in unprecedented magnitudes and direc-
tions. Unfortunately, it seems that the development of reliability management
reforms and operating procedures has lagged behind economic reforms in the
power industry. In addition, responsibility for reliability management has been
disaggregated to multiple institutions (Carrier et al., 2000). All this results
in an increase of the risk of blackouts, not only in North America, but also
world-wide.
The Disturbance Analysis Working Group (DAWG) database2 summarizes
disturbances that have occurred in the electric systems in North America. The
database is based on major electric utility system disturbances reported to the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the North American Electrical Reli-
ability Council (NERC). The data arise from government incident reporting
requirements criteria detailed in DOE form EIA-417.
Carreras et al. (2004) analyzed the first 15 years of data (1984-1998) from
the DAWG database. As currently four more years of data are available3 we
study two datasets: D98 covering the period 1984-1998 and D02 covering the
full data set 1984-2002. The first one is used for comparison with the previous
findings, while the second lets us extend the analysis and draw more up-
to-date conclusions. The data are of diverse magnitude and of varying causes
(including natural perils, human error, equipment malfunction, and sabotage).
It is not clear how complete these data are, but it seems to be the best-
documented source for blackouts in the North American power transmission
system. Besides the date and the region of occurrence, two measures of the
event’s severity are given: the amount of power lost (in MW) and the number
of customers affected.
There are 435 documented blackouts in the first 15 years (dataset D98),
which gives on average 29 blackouts per year. A few events have missing
data in one or both of the severity fields. For the analysis of blackout sizes
we have used only those 427 occurrences which have complete data in both
columns.4 The average inter-occurrence time is 12.6 days, but the blackouts
are distributed over the 15 years in a non-uniform manner with a maximum
waiting time of 252 days between event origins. Furthermore, the mean and the
maximum restoration times are 14 hours and 14 days, respectively, indicating
2 Publicly available from http://www.nerc.com/˜ dawg/database.html.
3 The delay in data distribution is due to the complexity of the problem. It can
take months after a large blackout to dig through the records, establish the events
occurring and reproduce a causal sequence of events.
4 However, for the waiting time distribution analysis we have used all occur-
rences. A preprocessed, spreadsheet-ready ASCII format datafile is available from
http://www.im.pwr.wroc.pl/˜ rweron/exchlink.html.
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Fig. 1. The quarterly number of blackout events from 1984 till 2002 (top) and
annual distribution of monthly events (bottom) for the North-American power grid.
that the inter-occurrence times are more or less equivalent to the quiet times
(the lapses of time between the end of a blackout and the beginning of the
next one).
In the full dataset (D02) there are 646 documented blackouts, yielding on
average 34 blackouts per year. However, only 578 occurrences have complete
severity data, since – especially in 1999 and 2000 – there are many missing
values. The average period of time between blackouts is now only 10.7 days,
indicating a recent increasing trend in the number of blackouts, while the
mean and the maximum restoration times are slightly higher: 16 hours and
15 days, respectively.
Although the scarcity of data limits sound statistical inference, looking at
the top panel of Fig. 1 we can intuitively divide the dataset into three parts: an
initial period of relatively volatile activity (1984-1990; quarters 1-28), followed
by a fairly calm period (1991-1998; quarters 29-60), and, most recently, a
period of increasing activity (1999-2002; quarters 61-76). Whether this is a
consequence of deregulation, different incident reporting procedures or simply
randomness remains an open question. However, the seasonal behavior of the
outages is indisputable. Roughly 30% of all blackouts take place in July and
August, see the bottom panel of Fig. 1, regardless of the dataset analyzed.
Our observations contradict earlier reports, where the authors detected no
evidence of systematic changes in the number of blackouts or (quasi-)periodic
behavior (Carreras et al., 2004).
A closer inspection of the waiting times between blackouts reveals a non-
trivial nature. The distribution does not have an exponential tail, as reported
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Fig. 2. The complementary cumulative distribution function (1 − CDF(τ )) of the
waiting times τ (measured in days) between two consecutive blackout origins for the
North-American power transmission system using the D02 (main panel) and D98
data sets (inset). The dashed lines represent exponential fits to the distributions. The
solid lines correspond to a stretch exponential fit (main panel) and the exponential
fit obtained by Carreras et al. (2004) using the same data set (inset).
e.g. by Chen et al. (2001), but rather a fatter one.5 As can be seen in Fig.
2 the deviation is significant for both D98 and D02. These findings question
the SOC-type approach to modeling blackout dynamics (Carreras et al., 2004)
since SOC-type dynamics should exhibit exponential decay in the waiting time
distribution (Boffetta et al., 1999, Carreras et al., 2004).
It is apparent that large blackouts, as the mentioned earlier August 1996
and August 2003 events, are rarer than small blackouts. But how much rarer
are they? Analysis of the D98 and D02 datasets shows that the complementary
cumulative probability distribution of the blackout sizes does not decrease
exponentially with the size of the outage, but rather has a power-law tail of
exponent α = 1, see Fig.3. Hence, if we evaluate the risk of a blackout as
the product of its frequency and cost (commonly regarded to be proportional
to unserved energy, see e.g. Billinton and Allan (1996)), then the total risk
associated with the large blackouts is – due to the power-law type distribution
of blackout sizes – much greater than the risk of small outages. This is strong
motivation for investigating the global dynamics of series of blackouts that
can lead to power-law tails. The investigated models, though, should take
into account all or at least most of the characteristics revealed in this study.
5 Waiting time distribution of high-frequency financial data show similar fatter-
than exponential distributions (Scalas et al., 2005).
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Fig. 3. The complimentary cumulative distribution (1−CDF(P)) of power lost (P)
due to blackouts for the North-American electric power transmission system.
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